Justice delivered over 2015 fighter jet crash. Court orders Lockheed Martin to pay compensation to families of two Greek pilots killed during NATO exercise in Spain Justice delivered over 2015 fighter jet crash The Los Llanos Air Base after the F-16 went down, in January 2015

 

This article was originally published in Ekathimerini and was written by Yiannis Papadopoulos on 06/06/2025.

 

According to the script of the NATO exercise held at the Los Llanos Air Bas in Spain in January 2015, the Greek two-seater F-16 was the second jet in an “arrow” formation whose mission was to protect a group of friendly aircraft. Just 7.8 seconds after takeoff, however, the jet came crashing down to the ground. Both pilots were killed even though they had tried to eject. Another nine French military personnel were also killed by the crashing aircraft and the explosions that followed, while 33 others were injured. Last March, a decade after the accident, a Greek court ordered the American company that had built the F-16 to pay the families of the two pilots compensation.

The decision from the Three-Judge Athens Court of Appeals was published on March 17, 2025. The court ruled that Lockheed Martin had failed to take all the necessary safety precautions and awarded significant damages to the plaintiffs. The investigation into the crash had found that the F-16 had not been properly trimmed before takeoff because a specific switch that controls the angle of the aircraft’s stabilators had been inadvertently moved to the wrong position.

The plaintiffs, who were represented by attorneys Elias Pavlakis and George Moschos, claimed that the crash was caused by a design flaw in the manual trim adjustment panel, as well as the failure to install a warning system to alert the crew in the event of unintentional movement or incorrect trim settings prior to takeoff. They also claimed that certain similar incidents should have prompted the company to take corrective action. The manufacturer denied any responsibility.

The lawsuits were filed in 2017 with the Athens Court of First Instance, but were dismissed at both the first and second instance on procedural grounds, as the Greek courts were found not to have international jurisdiction. Appeals were filed with the Supreme Court, however, and in 2022 it ruled that Greek courts do indeed have jurisdiction and referred the cases back to the Three-Member Court of Appeals to be re-examined by a different panel.

The recent decision, as reported by Kathimerini, sheds light on additional aspects of one of the deadliest accidents in the history of NATO exercises.

The Greek F-16 piloted by 35-year-old Captain Panagiotis Laskaris and 31-year-old co-pilot Athanasios Zagas was scheduled to carry out an air combat mission as part of a NATO exercise at Los Llanos Air Base, located 6 kilometers south of the city of Albacete, on January 26, 2015. Under normal circumstances, the crew would perform the standardized pre-takeoff checks near the edge of the runway, at the start of taxiing. However, the Greek squadrons, as well as those from other NATO member-states participating in the same exercise, carried out these checks at the parking position before taxiing. This had become a long-standing habit and was by then considered “common practice,” intended to prevent the dangerous congestion of aircraft and ground personnel near the runway.

The checks

The checks were completed some 20 minutes before takeoff. At 3.16 p.m. local time, just seconds after the aircraft took off, it rolled uncontrollably to the right and crashed near the air base’s Shelter D-4. After trying to right the aircraft, Laskaris deployed the ejection seat one second before the jet came crashing to the ground, while Zagas had activated the ejection seat half a second earlier. However, the aircraft’s position, pitch and altitude at the time of the incident no longer allowed for the safe use of the ejection seats. The crash of the F-16 resulted in the deaths of the two Greek pilots and nine French military personnel, while 33 service members were injured (21 French and 12 Italian). A French Mirage 2000D, a French Alpha Jet and an Italian AMX were completely destroyed.

The Lockheed Martin F-16 had been delivered to the Hellenic Air Force on January 7, 1997. When it went down, it had clocked 4,056.6 flight hours. In its own investigation of the incident, the Athens Air Force Court found that the two Greek airmen were fully qualified, were in good health and their toxicology reports were clear. The pilot-in-command had recently been certified as an instructor and had logged 1,527 flight hours, 940 of which were on F-16s. The co-pilot was certified as a four-aircraft formation leader and had 1,140 flight hours, including 536 on this model of F-16.

According to the sequence of events described in the Athens Appeal Court’s recent decision, the unintentional activation of the yaw trim switch and the roll trim knob on the manual trim control panel occurred 20 minutes before takeoff and within just 30 tenths of a second. This adjustment altered the position of the aircraft’s stabilators, resulting in “a drastic disruption of the aerodynamic parameters immediately after takeoff.”

The manual trim control panel is located on the pilot’s left rear console, outside their direct line of sight and roughly at elbow height. The space is cramped, offering limited freedom of movement, so the pilot must turn both torso and head to make any adjustments. At the time of the accident, the F-16 was not equipped with any visual or audible warning system, nor with a mechanism to prevent takeoff in the event of incorrect trim settings. However, as noted in the court file, other fighter jets – such as the F-18, F-15 and Mirage 2000 – were equipped with such warning systems at that time.

In its report on the incident, NATO’s safety investigation committee concluded that the yaw trim switch appears to have been unintentionally activated by contact with an object, rather than by deliberate action from the pilots. The board considered it likely that the cause was a rigid binder containing the flight checklists, which may have been placed in that area by the pilot-in-command. This binder is part of the required flight equipment carried by pilots. The board conducted relevant simulations and confirmed that this scenario was plausible.

The Athens court, however, dismissed this argument as speculation, arguing that the improper storage of the checklists in this particular case was not substantiated by any documentation or the available testimony.

The company’s claims

Lockheed Martin denied responsibility for the crash of the F-16, arguing that the aircraft was “structurally sound” and that all of its systems were functioning properly after engine start-up. It further stated that the switch in question was neither defective nor flawed – it was well-designed, fully functional, and, in their view, adequately protected against unintentional activation by two side barriers (U-shaped metal structures) and three rubber rings. The company cited technical guidelines stipulating that yaw trim must be set and checked three times during three distinct phases: during the internal cockpit check, during engine start-up and prior to takeoff. It also argued that the flight crew bore 99% of the responsibility for the crash, citing contributory negligence.

The other incidents

The case of the Greek F-16 was not unprecedented. According to the Athens court’s ruling, on June 12, 1994, an F-16 belonging to the US National Guard crashed after losing control shortly after taking off from an airbase in Colorado. The pilot was able to eject and survived. The official investigation concluded that the cause of the crash was the unintentional misconfiguration of the trim switches. The pilot reported that, during pre-takeoff preparations, he had dragged a bag containing personal items across the control panel and likely moved the switch without realizing it.

The court decision also includes details from an incident that is said to have taken place in December 2015, nearly a year after the Greek jet’s crash, during a flight safety review meeting held in Utah, USA.

The account is based on an official report by the director of flight safety at the Hellenic Tactical Air Force Headquarters in Larissa. Attending the meeting were representatives from the US Air Force General Staff, along with counterparts from several other countries operating F-16s in their fleets. According to the report, concerns were raised during the meeting about the inadequate design of the trim panel. At one point, the US representative asked the military personnel from other countries to raise their hands if they had encountered similar incidents involving the unintentional movement of the switch in question. The report notes that most participants raised their hands.

By the same account, the Turkish Air Force reported two similar incidents, in 2014 and 2015. It noted that the system of tubes and cables connecting the pilot’s helmet and oxygen mask ran alongside the trim panel and could unintentionally move the switches, causing changes to the settings.

The Three-Member Court of Appeals in Athens concluded that this issue was not only known by the manufacturer, but had also been a matter of concern for the air forces of other countries.

As for the captain’s response after takeoff, the court accepted that his actions were consistent with what would be expected, given that he was unaware of the incorrect trim setting. However, it ruled that, by virtue of his position, he bore 40% contributory negligence for failing to recheck the trim settings just before takeoff, when the aircraft was at the edge of the runway and there were still three minutes and 20 seconds to go.

Concerning this part of the case, the plaintiffs argued that the crew had followed instructions to the letter and that it had become standard practice to perform the trim check at the parking position before taxiing. There was no directive or established procedure requiring the repetition of checks that had already been completed.

Beginning in 2018-2019, the manufacturer installed a visual warning system for trim settings on the central digital console of these fighter jets. In the case of the Greek aircraft, this upgrade was implemented through the Viper modernization program.

According to the Three-Member Court of Appeals, this development indicates the US manufacturer’s acknowledgment of the issue.

The judges concluded that a different design of the trim panel would have prevented the crash and that such a redesign was feasible, as it did not depend on any subsequent technological advancement.

Este artículo es una traducción del original titulado “Justice delivered over 2015 fighter jet crash”, publicado en Ekathimerini y escrito por Yiannis Papadopoulos, el 06/06/2025.